稿件编号:20090410
谢屹.中国自然保护中的政府和国际组织博弈分析[J].世界林业研究,2009,22(4):53~57
中国自然保护中的政府和国际组织博弈分析
Game Analysis on Government and International Organizations in Nature Conservation in China
投稿时间:2009-04-17  
DOI:
中文关键词:  政府  国际组织  自然保护  博弈
英文关键词:government  international organization  nature conservation  game
基金项目:
作者单位
谢屹  
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中文摘要:
      近年来,博弈论在分析与解决社会、经济及生态环境问题中得到了广泛应用.非营利性国际组织逐渐成为中国自然保护领域的一股新生力量,影响着中国自然保护工作的开展.在对政府和国际组织在自然保护中的不同作用和利益差异进行分析的基础上,运用博弈理论探析两者的相互影响,并以中国虎保护战略调整为案例,分析了两者的博弈过程.对于中国政府而言,应在认清自身和国际组织在自然保护中的利益差异基础上,根据自身利益最大化原则,制定和优化本国自然保护战略.
英文摘要:
      In recent years,the game theory has been extensively applied to analyze and solve social,economic,ecological and environmental problems.The non-profit international organizations have become a new force to participate in nature conservation and affect the development of the conservation in China.The paper firstly discussed the differences of the government and the international organizations in their roles and interests in the conservation in China.The mutual influences between the government and the organizations were identified/analyzed by the game theory subsequently.Furthermore,the game process was argued by the case analysis on the tiger conservation policy modification in China.It was suggested that Chinese government should recognize the interest differences between itself and the international organizations in the conservation,and make a better national nature conservation strategy based on the principle to optimize its own interest.
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